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Regulatory Protective Measures and Risky Behavior:
Evidence from Ice Hockey
Alberto Chong and Pascual Restrepo∗
March 25, 2017

Abstract
We provide evidence supporting the Peltzman effect, by which individuals required
to wear protective gear end up taking additional risks that potentially offset the
intended aim of the device. We take advantage of the fact that wearing a visor—a
protective device in Ice Hockey—is mandatory in European, minor, and junior leagues
but not in the NHL. This allows us to estimate the impact of wearing a visor by
comparing the behavior in the NHL and other leagues of players who always wear a
visor with that of players who wear one only when it is required. We find that when
players are forced to wear a visor their behavior becomes more risky, earning an
additional 0.19 penalty in minutes per game (compared to the average 1.14 penalty in
minutes in our sample). We estimate an even larger effect of visors when we focus on
players who were forced to use one during the 2004 season, when the NHL canceled its
regular season and players had to move to European leagues temporarily. These
estimates are not driven by players’ observable attributes, playing style, or other
differences across leagues.
JEL Classification: K32, K23, H40
Keywords: Peltzman Effect, Protective Measures, Risky Behavior
The effectiveness of safety and protective devices, such as seatbelts in cars, helmets for bicycle
riders, or hormonal injections to prevent pregnancies, requires that the behavior of individuals remains
constant regardless of the use of such devices. However, it is unclear whether this is the case, or
whether people adapt to the additional protection by taking more risks, in which case the intended
effect may end up being diluted or even negated. The use of protective devices reduces the cost of risky
behavior and could increase aggressiveness and risk-taking. This behavioral response not only dampens
the effectiveness of the device
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but may also create negative spillovers on others. For example, risky driving endangers the driver, and it
imperils pedestrians and other passengers. The existence of this compensating behavior, widely known
as the Peltzman Effect, could have vast implications for government intervention and regulation in the
economy (see Peltzman, 1975).
Despite its relevance, the existing empirical evidence on compensating behavior remains scant and
inconclusive. Researchers have tested for the Peltzman Effect by measuring the impact of seatbelt laws
on fatalities among car occupants and pedestrians. Using time-series or cross-sectional variation, Harvey
and Durbin (1986); Asch et al. (1991); Garbacz (1992); Risa (1994); Loeb (1995) find an increase in
accidents or non-occupant fatalities following the introduction of seatbelt laws. But it is hard to take this
evidence as causal given that it relies only on cross-sectional or time-series variation—a fact that raises
concerns about omitted variables bias. In one notable exception, Cohen and Einav (2003) use withinstate variation and find no evidence of compensatory behavior following the staggered introduction of
seatbelt laws across US states. In addition to its lack of natural experiments to exploit, the empirical
literature’s main shortcoming is that it focuses on aggregate, imprecise, and indirect proxies of
behavior. 1 The use of aggregate data is likely to attenuate the estimates because compensating behavior
only arises from people for whom the regulation was binding—the compliers. Moreover, aggregate
outcomes can be contaminated by other policies. In the seatbelt case, safety awareness campaigns are
typically implemented along with seatbelt regulation.
In this paper we exploit a natural experiment from Ice Hockey that addresses these shortcomings
and provides robust evidence of the Peltzman effect. We take advantage of the fact that wearing a
visor—a protective device in Ice Hockey—is mandatory in European, minor, and junior leagues but not in
the NHL. We identify compliers by checking which players did not use a visor in the NHL—where it is up
to the players to decide if they want to use a visor or not. This allows us to estimate the impact of
wearing a visor by comparing the behavior in the NHL and other leagues of always wearers—players
who willingly wear a visor—with that of compliers—players who only wear one when it is mandatory.
Peltzman’s theory suggests that wearing a visor provides players with additional protection and an extra
sense of safety, which translates into more aggressive skating. We measure this behavioral response at
the individual level using penalty in minutes per game, a commonly accepted variable in Ice Hockey that
reflects aggressiveness and risky behavior(see Ashare, ed, 2000). Players earn penalty minutes for
boarding, charging, checking, and related behavior that imposes risk not only on their selves but, more
importantly, on other players, too.
We focus on the universe of players who skated in the NHL during the 2001 to 2006 regular seasons,
for whom we obtained detailed individual data on personal characteristics and game-play statistics for
the NHL 2001-2006 seasons and seasons during which they skated in European, minor pro, or junior
leagues, all of which mandate visor use. In addition, for every player we collect data on whether he wore
a visor willingly while playing in the NHL 2001-2006 seasons. We estimate the behavioral effect of
1 Besides the literature on seatbelt regulation, our paper is related to recent contributions that investigate
the existence of the Peltzman effect in sports. Pope and Tollison (2010) and Sobel and Nesbit (2007) use data
from competitive car racing, in which compliance and enforcement are automatic. Although these studies find
evidence of compensating behavior, they rely on imperfect proxys for risk taking and cannot account for trends
in racing accidents that could compromise the interpretation of their results.
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requiring a player to wear a visor by comparing the differences in penalty in minutes per game between
compliers and always wearers in the NHL 2001-2006 regular seasons—where only always wearers skate
with a visor—with the difference in leagues that require both type of players to wear a visor. We also
exploit the fact that there was no 2004 season in the NHL. The lockout led to an exogenous and
temporary exodus of players to European and minor pro leagues, where compliers were required to
wear a visor. Both empirical strategies identify the effect that wearing a visor has on compliers, when
due to league regulation they are forced to wear one.
Unlike most of the existing empirical evidence, we find that there is significant compensating
behavior among hockey players when they are required to wear a visor. We estimate that whereas the
average penalty in minutes per game is 1.13, mandatory visor wearing produces a substantial increase of
0.19 penalty in minutes per game. We also find that wearing a visor has a small, negative effect on
performance, measured by goals per game, which is consistent with players claims that visors tend to
reduce vision (although the fact that these effects are not very robust and are small suggests that some
of these claims may be exaggerated). We obtain very similar results when we focus on the 2004 lockout.
We find that while compliers and always wearers behaved similarly during the 2001-2003 NHL seasons,
compliers earned 0.4 more penalty minutes than always wearers during the lockout in 2004 when they
had to play in other leagues that require visor use. Reassuringly, when players returned to the NHL in
2005 and 2006 this difference between compliers and always wearers vanished. Finally, we provide
evidence that suggests that our results are not driven by compliers being differentially affected by other
league characteristics or by observable differences across players that could determine whether they
adapt differently to certain leagues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we explain in detail the institutional
features of Ice Hockey, and we describe our data and our identification strategy. In section 2 we present
our results and provide evidence that supports our causal interpretation of the estimates. We conclude
in section 3.

1

Empirical strategy and data

An on-going controversy in the National Hockey League (NHL), which is the top professional Ice Hockey
league in the world, is whether wearing a visor should be voluntary. Visors are strong transparent fiber
shields designed to protect a players’ eyes and face. During our period of study, from 2001 to 2006, only
one third of hockey players in the NHL wore a visor. This number appears to be exceedingly given that
year after year there are horrifying and high-profile cases of players who did not wear a visor and were
gravely injured. Two reasons are commonly cited to explain this behavior. First, hockey players believe
that their performance can be compromised by a visor; sweat and dirt on the visor can interfere with the
player?s vision. 2 Second, Ice Hockey is associated with a macho subculture within which players believe
it is important to send the signal that they have the courage not to wear a visor.

A related view is that, if visors affect the relative performance of players, its use would involve strategic
considerations. In this case, requiring the use of a protective measure may improve the well-being of
individuals (see Schelling (1978)).
2
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To investigate the impact of visors on game-play, we collect data on 833 players who were active in
the NHL during the 2001-2006 seasons. During these NHL seasons players could decide whether or not
to wear a visor. Using data collected by Cullen (2006), we identify 268 players who wore a visor in the
NHL during these seasons when it was not required—the always wearers. The remaining 565 players—
the compliers—did not wear a visor in the NHL during these seasons. 3 We complement these data with
detailed playing statistics for regular seasons played in other leagues that required all players to wear a
visor. These include: professional European leagues; feeder leagues, including minor-pro leagues in
North America and major-junior leagues in Canada; and junior or college leagues in North America. 4 Our
choice of sample guarantees that always wearers use a visor in all leagues in our sample (hence the
label), while compliers only use one in the leagues that have a mandatory visor requirement (European,
minor pro and junior leagues).
Table 1 summarizes the game-play statistics for always wearers and compliers when they skate both
in the NHL (seasons 2001 to 2006) or in leagues that require visors. We have a total of 8,053
player/season cells. Always wearers totaled 1,262 seasons in the NHL (from 2001 to 2006) and 1,259
seasons in other leagues. Compliers totaled 2,460 seasons in the NHL (from 2001 to 2006) and 3,072
seasons in other leagues. The bottom rows of Table 1 display summary statistics for players’ observable
characteristics, including their birth year, birth place, weight and height.
We use Penalties in Minutes (PIM) per game to measure players’ risky behavior on the ice. This
statistic represents the average time in minutes that a player remains penalized during a game. Players
earn penalty minutes for behavior that endangers themselves and other players, such as charging,
boarding, elbowing, kicking, attempting to injure other players, fighting, cross-checking, and hitting an
opponent with the head. The Online Appendix presents a list of the main actions for which players earn
penalties. The most common types of penalties in the National Hockey League are hooking, holding, and
interfering, which represent around forty-five percent of total penalties. Other common penalties are
slashing, tripping, roughing, high-sticking, and cross-checking, which represent about thirty percent of
infractions.

Our data on visor use was provided by an NHL analyst (Cullen, 2006) who collected player-level
information on visor use. For the NHL, we have visor use data only for the 2001-2006 seasons; thus, we do not
use playing statistics from other NHL seasons. We take a conservative approach and only code a player as a
complier if he never used a visor during these seasons. Our coding scheme guarantees that, although some
players switched to wearing a visor during the NHL 2001-2006 seasons, we do not exploit this potentially
endogenous variation. In any case, during our period of study it was exceedingly rare that visor wearers would
become non-wearers and vice-versa. The rare exceptions are six players who changed from non-wearers to
wearers, mostly after suffering serious eye or head injuries. Half of these players eventually went back to nonwearing status. Not surprisingly, coding these players as compliers does not change our findings.
4 We exclude non-NHL leagues data for seasons when it was not mandatory to wear a visor. We do so
because in those cases we are unable to determine which players wore a visor. As an illustration, visor wearing
became mandatory in the American Hockey League (AHL) in 2006. In this case we do not include any of the
seasons in this league before 2006 because we do not know whether or not players wore a visor. In addition,
some leagues introduced mandatory visors with a “grandfather clause,” which allowed some players to skate
without wearing a visor. We exclude the corresponding data for the exempted players in these leagues, as we
do not know whether or not they wore a visor. The Online Appendix contains a full description of the leagues
in our sample.
3
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We believe that penalties in minutes per game provide a useful measure of risky behavior for several
reasons. First, it measures individual behavior in a frequent, transparent, precise and comparable
manner. Second, although players also earn penalty minutes for inappropriate behavior unrelated to
their risk-taking, such as making obscene gestures or delaying the game, these non-contact infractions
represent less than five percent of the total number of infractions Lopez (2015). Third, penalty minutes
per game remain a widely accepted proxy for risky behavior and aggressiveness by offending players
(see Ashare, ed, 2000). Fourth, penalties in minutes per game capture a key aspect of the Peltzman
effect: the possibility that the additional risk-taking not only reduces the effectiveness of wearing a visor
in preventing injuries but can endanger other players and bystanders. In a world in which players
behave optimally, only these negative spillovers have a first-order effect on welfare. The spillovers—
reflected in an increase in penalties in our context—might be the most consequential component of
Peltzman’s theory.
Our key premise is that by reducing the cost of risk and providing players with an additional sense of
safety, wearing a visor could encourage compliers to skate more fiercely, take more risks, and as a result
earn more penalties, even though not all types of penalties will increase as a consequence. This
aggressiveness is observed in the all-around game of the player, in the way he takes risks, the way he
faces other players, and the way he deals with the puck. Penalized actions such as tripping, slashing,
elbowing, and charging are all part of this more aggressive behavior. Our premise is consistent with
evidence related to the use of helmets in other sports, such as skiing, in which ski patrollers strongly
believe that helmets encourage recklessness (Evans et al., 2009). It is also plausible that wearing a visor
may prime players for risk-taking, even in situations in which the visor does not grant additional
protection (see Gamble and Walker, 2016, for experimental evidence regarding bicycle helmets).
To estimate the effect of mandatory visor wearing, we compare the behavior of always wearers to
that of compliers in leagues in which both were required to wear a visor against their behavior in the
2001-2006 NHL seasons, when compliers did not wear a visor but always wearers did. Table 1 anticipates
our main result. As always wearers move from the NHL to leagues that require visor use, they receive
0.52 additional penalties in minutes per game, while compliers receive 0.67 additional penalties in
minutes per game. Our strategy attributes the 0.15 difference in penalties in minutes per game to the
mandatory use of visors. The table also shows that both types of players are frequently penalized: in the
NHL, always wearers earn 0.64 penalties in minutes per game, while compliers earn 0.93 penalties in
minutes per game.

2

The impact of visors on penalties

To investigate the impact of wearing a visor, we estimate the model
PIMisl = αi + θl + κs + βCi × Ml + εisl.

(1)

Here PIMisl are the penalty in minutes per game given to player i during season s in league l. Also, Ci is a
dummy that takes the value 1 for compliers and 0 for always wearers, and Ml is a dummy that takes the
value 0 in leagues in which visors are not mandatory (NHL) and 1 in which they are (European, minor
pro, and junior leagues). We estimate the model with a full set of player, season, and league fixed
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effects (αi, κs, and θl), which control for player heterogeneity, trends in Ice Hockey, and differences
across leagues that affect all players equally. εisl is a random error term orthogonal to the left hand side
variables. For inference we focus on standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation within individual players. Finally, we weight each observation by the number of games
played in the season so that our estimates reflect actual behavior during the games played.
Our choice of sample guarantees that whenever we observe a player in a league with Ml = 1, we are
certain that he was wearing a visor because enforcement is automatic. Thus, the interaction term Ci ×Ml
captures variation in the use of visors that stems uniquely from differences in league regulation and that
affects only compliers. We will interpret β as the causal effect of being required to wear a visor. Below
we provide evidence in support of our interpretation.
We estimate equation (1) via OLS and report our findings in Panel A of Table 2. Column 1 presents
estimates in which we control only for season dummies, a dummy for leagues that have mandatory
visors, a dummy for compliers, and the interaction term Ci × Ml. We estimate that mandatory visor
wearing increases penalty in minutes by 0.158 (standard error=0.056 in parenthesis), which roughly
matches our calculations using the summary statistics. This is a sizable effect compared to the average
1.13 penalty in minutes per game in our sample. The coefficient on the compliers’ dummy suggest that
this group is on average more aggressive than always wearers, independent of whether or not they wear
a visor. Because more aggressive players are less likely to wear visors in the NHL, crosssectional
estimates would mistakenly conclude that not wearing a visor makes players skate fiercely, which
underscores the value of our approach. The coefficient on the leagues that have mandatory visors
suggest either that players in these leagues are more aggressive or that these leagues have tougher
penalization standards.
The additional columns show that our basic result does not change when we include additional
covariates. In column 2 we include player characteristics such as position, age, experience, dummies for
year of birth, dummies for country of birth (state of birth for Americans and province of birth for
Canadians), weight, and height. In column 3 we also control for a full set of league effects (here we
cannot estimate the coefficient for mandatory leagues). In column 4 we go one step further and control
for season×league effects (using the leagues reported in the Online Appendix). This specification
controls flexibly for overtime changes in leagues, provided that these affect all players equally. Finally, in
column 5 we include a full set of player fixed effects (here we cannot estimate the coefficient for
compliers). These dummies control flexibly for cross-sectional differences between players, and they
guarantee that we identify the effect of visors only from within-player variation. In this demanding
specification, which is also our preferred specification, we find that wearing a visor raises penalties in
minutes per game by 0.188 (standard error=0.048). This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level,
and it is fairly stable across specifications.
With regards to our findings, one potential is how we conducted our inference. Although we
included a full set of league×season dummies in columns 4 and 5, it is possible that some residual
correlation remains in the error term of players who skate in the same league and during the same
season. We address this concern by computing standard errors that are robust to clustering within
players and within league×season, as described in Cameron et al. (2011). Because we have 833 players
and 293 league×season cells (reported in the bottom rows), the two-way clustering provides valid
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inference. Reassuringly, the new set of standard errors—reported in square brackets below each
estimate—are only slightly larger than or are comparable to our baseline ones—reported in parenthesis
below each estimate.
Our estimates in Panel A exploit the fact that before (or after) skating in the NHL, players also
participate in European, minor pro, and junior leagues that sanction the use of visors. Although these
movements across leagues occur naturally and frequently as players advance in their careers, one might
be concerned that players sort non-randomly into leagues that mandate visor use. 5
To address the nonrandom movement of players across leagues and complement our initial findings,
we exploit a sharp natural experiment: the 2004 NHL lockout. The lockout, which started due to salary
disagreements between the NHL and the players’ union (NHLPA), led to the cancellation of the 2004
regular season. As a result, a large number of players moved to other professional leagues that during
season, many of which are located Europe. We investigate the consequences of the lockout by focusing
on 236 players who were active in the NHL from 2001 to 2003, but in 2004 had to move to an European
league or a minor pro league which mandated visor use. We then estimate equation (1) only for these
players and compare their statistics for the 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006 NHL seasons to the 2004
season in European or minor-pro leagues. By construction, the players in this subsample only wore a
visor during the 2004 lockout. The advantage of this experiment is that the movement from the NHL was
only temporary and induced by the exogenous lockout of the NHL during the 2004 season. 6
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents our estimates when we exploit the variation in leagues
induced by the 2004 lockout. Although this is a smaller sample and our estimates are more noisy, we
find in column 1 that during the lockout, mandatory visors raised the penalties in minutes per game of
compliers by 0.365 (standard error=0.121). The remaining columns show that this estimate remains
roughly unchanged when we control for player heterogeneity, trends in Ice Hockey, and differences
across leagues that affect all players equally. In our preferred specification in column 5 we find an
estimated effect of visors on penalties of 0.438 (standard error=0.133). Reassuringly, in this sample we
find that once we account for players’ observable attributes, there is no difference in the behavior of
compliers and always wearers in the NHL (compliers earn 0.061 more penalties in minutes per game
than always wearers, a small and not-statistically significant effect). Thus, in the sample of players
affected by the 2004 lockout, always wearers provide a suitable control group for compliers. (We do not
report the mandatory league effect because it is collinear with the season dummies.)
Besides the two sets of standard errors reported in Panel A, in Panel B we also take an
Although our strategy of exploiting the 2004 lockout deals partly with this concern, we believe that
selection does not affect our estimates in Panel A for two related reasons. First, players switch leagues at high
frequencies, in contrast to league rules and characteristics, which remain largely unchanged. In our sample,
players change leagues 37.5% of the time at the end of the current season. This fact suggests that players are
churning more than they are sorting, and the churning seems unrelated to league characteristics. Second,
before reaching the NHL, players must have skated in some feeder leagues that mandate visors. Players cannot
selectively avoid these feeder leagues.
6 There might still be some selection in this sample given that the decision to participate in professional ice
hockey during the lockout is not random. We thank the editor for bringing this to our attention.
5
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alternative approach to inference. Because in these models we only have 15 season× league cells, the
asymptotic limits that justify our inference may not hold. To address this concern, below each model we
report the p−value for a Wild Bootstrap test of the null that β = 0 (see Cameron et al., 2008). This
procedure provides valid inference when the error terms are correlated within players and for players in
the same league and season, even if the number of clusters becomes small. In all cases we reject the null
that β = 0 at conventional levels.
One additional advantage of the 2004 lockout is that we can trace the changhe over time in the
difference in penalties between compliers and always wearers. Figure 1 illustrates this feature by
plotting the estimated difference between compliers and always wearers from 2001 to 2006. These
differences are obtained by estimating a version of equation (1) in which we interact the dummy for
compliers with the season dummies, while simultaneously controlling for players’ observable attributes
and league effects. The figure shows that compliers were slightly more violent during the 2001, 2002,
2003 and 2005 seasons, and equally violent during the 2006 season. Until the 2003 season, both groups
of players obtained a similar amount of penalty minutes. However, during the 2004 lockout, when
compliers were required to wear a visor, they became significantly more violent, earning 0.45 penalties
in minutes per game more than always wearers. This difference disappeared when the players moved
back to the NHL in 2005—at which point compliers stopped wearing visors. This is exactly the pattern
one would expect if mandatory visor rules made compliers more violent during the 2004 lockout.

2.1

Controlling for other differences between leagues

Our interpretation of β as the causal effect of wearing a visor hinges on the assumption that league
characteristics other than visor regulation do not differentially affect compliers. (This is analogous to the
equal-trends assumption used in difference in differences designs.) We now explore if this assumption is
plausible and whether we can relax it by controlling for observed differences among players and
leagues.
As Table 1 summarizes, there are marked observable differences between the NHL and leagues that
mandate visor use. Both players earn more penalties in leagues that mandate visor use, which probably
reflects differences in penalization standards. These differences could bias our results if penalization
standards have a disproportionate effect on compliers, who are inherently more aggressive. If stricter
penalization does not significantly modify behavior, then compliers would mechanically have higher
penalties in minutes in leagues that mandate visor use, which would lead to an upward bias in our
estimate. On the other hand, stricter penalization standards could have a stronger dissuasive effect on
aggressive players, implying a downward bias in our estimates. Another possibility is that compliers and
always wearers adapt differently to more competitive leagues, like the NHL.
As a first step towards exploring the role of league differences and their impact on compliers, we
estimate (1) for our full sample of players but we allow the effect of wearing a visor to vary by league. In
particular, we estimate separately the effect that wearing a visor has in US college leagues, junior
leagues (in both Canada and the US), the major-junior leagues in Canada, minor-pro leagues, and
European leagues. Figure 2 plots the estimates and their respective confidence intervals, sorting the
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leagues from left to right according to how competitive they are. For all leagues we find a positive effect
of mandatory visor.

Confidence intervals robust to correlation within players
Confidence intervals robust to correlation within each league's season
Figure 1: This figure plots estimates of the difference in penalty in minutes per game earned by
compliers—players who do not wear visors when allowed to in the NHL—and those earned by alwayswearers—players who always wear a visor. We plot these differences for all seasons from 2001 to 2006
for the set of player who were active in the NHL during the 2003 season but had to move during the
2004 lockout to a different league that mandated the use of visors wearing with a similar point estimate.
This finding shows that our results are not driven by European leagues, and thus they cannot be
explained by a different adaptation of compliers to European hockey. Furthermore, our results are not
driven by minor leagues only, and thus they cannot be explained by a different adaptation of compliers
to more competitive league.
The small differences in the behavior of compliers across leagues that mandate visor use do not
seem to correlate with how competitive leagues are. Excluding the NHL, European leagues are arguably
the most competitive and college and junior leagues the least, and yet we find a large and comparable
effect of visors in these leagues. Nor do the small differences in point estimates seem to reflect stricter
penalization standards or tolerance towards violence. The figure also plots the average penalties in
minutes that players get in each league, and these seem unrelated to our point estimates. Canadian
major-junior
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Estimated impact of wearing a visor
Confidence intervals robust to correlation within players
Confidence intervals robust to correlation within each league's season
Average PIM per game in each league
Figure 2: This figure plots estimates of the effect of visors on penalties in minutes per game. We plot
the estimates separately for the leagues indicated in the horizontal axis, and we sort from left to right
from the most to the least competitive. We also plot in the left vertical axis the average penalties in
minutes per game earned by players on each league. Leagues grant 1.7 penalties in minutes per game to
players and are seen as highly tolerant of violence, while European leagues only grant 1.2 minutes per
game and are believed to be less tolerant of violence. Yet, their point estimates are roughly equal.
As a placebo test, we can also compute how penalties change when compliers move across leagues
that mandate visor use. We estimate no difference in behavior between compliers and always wearers
as they move from junior and college leagues in North America to feeder leagues (Canadian major-junior
and minor-pro leagues), or when they move from feeder leagues in North America to professional
leagues in Europe. Compared to always wearers, compliers only earn 0.050 additional penalties in
minutes per game in the feeder leagues relative to junior and college leagues (standard error=0.1) and
0.051 additional penalties in minutes per game in European leagues relative to feeder leagues (standard
error=0.09). Overall, we find that these movements across leagues that require players to wear a visor
do not affect compliers disproportionately.
In Figure 3 we go one step further and estimate the impact that wearing a visor has on compliers
separately for each of the leagues that mandate visors. This yields the set of 24 estimates plotted in the
figure, together with their average—depicted by the dashed line—and their smoothed density—in
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black. (We lose 4 small leagues for which we only observe one type of player.) The figure shows that
compliers systematically earn more penalty minutes in almost all leagues that mandate visor use. The
only exceptions are two small leagues: the Central Junior A Hokey League and the Central Collegiate
Hockey Association. Despite the fact that the variation in this figure also contains estimation error, most
of our estimates are clustered around the mean, which suggests that our findings are common to most
leagues, and that league differences—other than visor regulation—do not affect compliers in a
consequential way.

Figure 3: This figure plots the frequency histogram for the estimates of the effect of visors on penalties
in minutes per game in each of the 24 leagues that mandate visor use. The dashed orange line
represents the average of these estimates and the solid black line their smoothed density.
As a second step to explore the role of league differences and their impact on compliers, we present
in Table 3 estimates of an augmented version of equation (1) in which observable league characteristics
can differentially impact compliers. For comparison, in column 1 we reproduce our baseline estimates,
which control for player and league×season fixed effects. Because we obtain similar standard errors
using different assumptions, in this exercise and what follows we only report standard errors robust
against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within players.
In columns 2 to 4 we explore whether the behavior of compliers changes when they skate in leagues
that have stricter penalization standards or in more competitive leagues. We use the average penalty
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minutes earned by always-wearers as a proxy for a league?s penalization standards, although in practice
the response of players to different standards and differences in league tolerance towards violence
make this proxy imperfect. (We lose 4 observations because in some small leagues we do not observe
always-wearers.) Also, following the view of most hockey experts, we rank the NHL as the most
competitive league, followed by European leagues, minor pro-leagues, Canadian minor leagues, junior
leagues, and finally college leagues, and we use the rank of each league as a proxy for how competitive it
is. When we include the interactions between compliers and our proxy for penalization standards and
competitiveness, we find that compliers earn fewer penalties in leagues that have stricter penalization
standards and more penalties in more competitive leagues. As anticipated by our discussion of Figure 2,
the estimated interactions are quantitatively small and not significant. More importantly, once we
account for these differences we estimate an even larger effect of wearing a visor on penalties in
minutes per game. In columns 5 and 6 we present a similar exercise that focuses on the sample of
players affected by the 2004 lockout. In this case we cannot separately identify the effect of compliers
moving to more competitive leagues (most players moved to European leagues during the lockout), so
we focus on the interaction between compliers and league penalization standards. As we found in the
full sample, differences in penalization standards do not seem to affect our estimates of the impact of
wearing a visor.
In column 7 of Table 3 we estimate our model separately for professional leagues (only European
leagues and the NHL). This model shows first, that our findings hold when we focus only on professional
hockey and, second, that we are not capturing differences between amateur and professional players. In
addition, in column 8 we estimate our model separately for the NHL and its main feeder leagues in
North America (the minor-pro leagues and Canada major-junior leagues). This model exploits the fact
that before skating in the NHL, many players went through feeder leagues in North America. The latter
share a common culture, similar attitudes and playing style to the NHL, but differ in that they require
players to wear a visor. When we focus on this sample we still find that, relative to always wearers,
compliers earn more penalties when forced to wear a visor in feeder leagues than they do in the NHL.
The above evidence suggest that, besides the regulations that govern visor use, observable league
differences do not affect compliers disproportionately, and hence they do not pose a treat to our
identification strategy. We now investigate a related albeit different concern: the possibility that
unobserved league differences—those not captured by the average penalties in the league or its rank in
the competitive scale—affect players with some observable attributes differentially. For example, league
rules could have different impacts on players in some positions; league rules also could have a
disproportionate effect on players who typically earn more penalties; or the NHL playing style and
culture could affect European players. Such differences could bias our estimates if compliers and always
wearers differ in their observable attributes.
To address this concern, we extend the specification in equation (1) by allowing mandatory leagues
to have a differential impact that varies depending on observable player attributes. In particular, we
estimate the model
PIMisl = αi + θl + κs + βCi × Ml + γXi × Ml + εisl,

(2)
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in which the interaction term Xi ×Ml controls for differences in the behavior of players who have
attributes Xi when they skate in a league that requires visor use.
Table 4 presents our estimates for this extended model. Panel A presents our results for our full
sample, while Panel B focuses on the players affected by the 2004 lockout. For comparison, we present
our baseline estimates with player and season× league effects. In the remaining columns we control
gradually for interactions between leagues that mandate visors and observable player characteristics.
The first row presents the estimated effect of visors; the bottom rows presents the interactions. In
column 2 we allow players born in different years and who belong to different NHL cohorts to behave
differently in leagues that require visor use. In column 3 we allow players in different positions to
behave differently in leagues that mandate visor use (the excluded category are defenders, who happen
to be the players who earn the most penalty minutes). This test is important because visor use is not
equal across positions. In column 4 we allow players of different heights and weights to behave
differently in leagues that mandate visor use. In column 5 we allow US and Canadian players to behave
differently in leagues that mandate visor use, which is relevant given that players born in Europe are
more likely to wear visors. Overall, we find that controlling for any potential differences in behavior
explained by observable player attributes has a modest impact on our estimates of the effect of visors.
This occurs despite the fact that the observable attributes that we include explain about 50% of the
cross-sectional difference in playerpenalties. For our full sample, we estimate in column 5 that players
forced to wear a visor earn 0.146 additional penalties in minutes per game as a result (standard
error=0.047). For the lockout sample, we estimate in column 5 that players forced to wear a visor earn
0.403 additional penalties in minutes per game as a result (standard error=0.131). Both estimates are
slightly smaller but comparable to our baseline estimates, which are shown in column 1. Although
players that have some attributes behave differently in the NHL relative to leagues that mandate visor
use, these differences do not seem to be quantitatively important nor do they introduce a significant
source of bias in our estimates.
As shown in Table 1, compliers are inherently more aggressive and are penalized more often than
always wearers. This raises the possibility that our results may be driven by a differential impact of
league differences on more aggressive players—independently of whether or not these players are
compliers. Bias could arise if leagues that mandate visor use have different penalization standards
(assuming these are not captured by the average penalties in each league), less tolerance towards
violence, or different game styles, and if these differences affect the behavior of aggressive players
disproportionately. In columns 6 and 7 we address this possibility by controlling for interactions of our
dummy for leagues that mandate visor use and two measures of individual player aggression. In column
6 we proxy aggressiveness by the penalties in minutes per game obtained by each player during the
previous season. This measure has the advantage of being predetermined, but we lose data for the first
season in which each player skated. In column 7 we proxy aggressiveness by a jackknifed average of the
penalties in minutes per game obtained by each player in all NHL seasons except the current one. 7 Both
7 We use a jackknifed average to exclude data from the current season to form our regressors. Otherwise,
we would mechanically introduce some attenuation bias to our estimates of the effect of visors. In addition, we
use only the penalty minutes earned in the NHL to construct our measure because game-play statistics for these
seasons are comparable for all players. Although not reported to save space, we obtained similar results when
we used a jackknifed average of penalties over all seasons to form our proxy for aggressiveness.
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proxies have great explanatory power: in a regression that explains current penalties, both proxies have
t−statistics above 100. Using both measures we find that more aggressive players earn more penalties in
leagues that mandate visor use. The estimated differences are significant and now the effect of visors
falls from 0.14 to 0.1 (standard error=0.044) in the top panel and from 0.4 to 0.36 (standard error=0.12)
in the bottom panel. Overall, this exercise suggests that although there are significant differences for
more aggressive players, explicitly controlling for such differences does not affect our conclusions. This is
especially the case when we focus on the 2004 lockout. As observed before, once we control for players’
attributes, compliers do not differ from always wearers in terms of their penalty minutes before the
lockout (or after), and thus differences in aggressiveness among players cannot explain the large effects
that we estimate in the lockout sample. In the case of our full sample, aggressiveness does play a more
important role. But our results in Panel A show that we still find that visor use has a significant and large
impact when we control in various ways for differences in player aggressiveness and observable
attributes.

2.2

Do visors reduce performance?

We now turn to the question of whether visor use affects performance, as measured by goals,
assists, and points per game. Table 5 presents our estimates. The left panel presents results for our full
sample, while the right panel focuses on the sample of players affected by the 2004 lockout. We focus
on the specification with player and season×league fixed effects, and we report standard errors that are
robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within players. Overall, we find a negative effect
of wearing a visor on performance, although it is only statistically significant at traditional levels for goals
and points per game in our full sample. Our point estimates in columns 1 to 3 suggest that visors reduce
goals per game by 0.025, assists per game by 0.019, and points per game by 0.044. These effects are
rather small once we compare them to an average of 0.24 goals, 0.38 assists, and 0.62 points per game
in our sample. Moreover, our confidence intervals cannot rule out very small (or zero) effects. We view
these results as consistent, but not entirely supportive, of players’ complaints that visors reducing their
vision and performance because they become fogged and are uncomfortable to wear. 8

3

Concluding remarks

This paper shows that when forced to wear a visor, ice hockey players earn more penalties. We
interpret the increase in penalties as evidence of the Peltzman effect: by reducing the cost of risk-taking
and providing players with an additional sense of security, visors induce players to skate more fiercely
and aggressively. The resulting behavior not only reduces the effectiveness of visors, it also raises the
potential for injuries that visors do not prevent. More importantly, the risky behavior of players
endangers both their-selves and other players.
To estimate the impact of visors on players behavior we compare compliers—players who only wear
a visor when mandated—with always wearers—players who wear a visor willingly—as they move from
Interestingly, because compliers tend to perform worst than always-wearers, a cross-sectional estimate
would mistakenly suggest that visors improve performance.
8
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leagues that require visor use to the NHL, in which visor use is not mandatory. This comparison suggests
that mandatory visors caused compliers to earn 0.19 additional penalties in minutes per game. We
estimate an even larger effect of visors when we focus on the NHL players who were forced to wear one
during the 2004 season, when the NHL canceled its regular season and players migrated to European
leagues or minor-pro leagues that required the use of visors.
We interpret our findings as the causal effect of visors, and provide evidence to support our
interpretation. In particular, we provide evidence that our results are not driven by differential effects of
league characteristics on players. Four arguments support this point: First, we find positive and similar
point estimates of wearing a visor on compliers for all leagues that mandate visor use. Despite the
differences across these leagues, it is their common characteristic of mandatory visor use that seems to
drive our estimates. Second, leagues’ geographic location, how competitive they are, or differences in
penalization standards do not drive our results. In particular, controlling directly for the differential
impact of these observable league characteristics on compliers did not change our results. Fourth,
although we find that players that differ in observable attributes (how aggressive they are or their
birthplace) behave differently in leagues that mandate visor use, accounting for such differences does
not affect our results, especially in the sample of players affected by the 2004 lockout.
We believe our results are not unique to Ice Hockey. Concerns about the Peltzman effect frequently
arise in discussions of sports and safety equipment. A series of pieces in the New York Times that
described the use of protective gear in female Lacrosse voiced the concerns of coaches who worried
about the “gladiator effect,” or the possibility that headgear could foster fiercer play (see Schwarz, 2011;
Pennington, 2015, 2016). When discussing the use of full face masks in College Ice Hockey, an article in
USA Hockey magazine also referenced the gladiator effect, asserting that “The coaches’ position is the
full cage gives kids kind of a gladiator effect, a feeling of invincibility that leads them to play the game in
a more reckless manner” (see Myers, 2012). In the case of American Football, the chairman of the NFL
Competition Committee voiced a similar concern: that “as helmets have gotten bigger, harder and
better at protecting players’ heads from injuries, the unintended consequence has been that players are
more confident in their helmets—and therefore more willing to launch themselves headfirst into
opposing players” (see Smith, 2011). Jim McKenna, a rugby coach featured in an article published in the
Guardian, claimed that “American footballers tackle with their heads, butting each other in a way
seldom seen in rugby.” He concludes that helmets are partly to blame, as they only encourage football
players to use more force (see Bodenner, 2016; Khaleeli, 2013). In the case of skydiving, ‘Booth’s rule
#2,’ which is attributed to famous skydiver Bill Booth, states that “the safer skydiving gear becomes, the
more chances skydivers will take, in order to keep the fatality rate constant” (Zolli and Healy, 2013)
These concerns also have influenced the debate on whether cities should make bicycle helmet use
mandatory, with some arguing that “Cyclists with helmets are liable to take more risks because they
consider themselves safe” (see van der Zee, 2015).
The insights of our research are related to other settings outside sports in which there is an active
debate on whether insurance or protective gear encourage risk taking, or if on the contrary they could
make risk more salient and reduce risk taking. Medical providers and health care professionals worry
about “risk compensation:” the possibility that better treatments or prevention technologies could
encourage people to take more risks. For example, HIV treatments or methods that reduce its rate of
contagion—male circumcision, drugs, or easier access to condoms—could also encourage a more risky
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sexual behavior (the evidence remains mixed. See de Walque et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2014). More
generally, concerns about moral hazard—the possibility that once insured individuals will take more
risks—plague insurance markets (Cummins and Tennyson, 1996; Cohen and Dehejia, 2004; Einav et al.,
2013). Similarly, in climate science, there are concerns that the more people learn about technologies to
adapt to climate change, the less they will support policies to mitigate it (even though Carrico et al.,
2015, find no evidence of this effect). Our paper shows that in the particular context of Ice Hockey,
players respond to a decline in the cost (or perceived cost) of risk by engaging in more risky behavior.
Mandatory visors do not seem to encourage less risk taking by raising awareness or making risk more
salient.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.

Always wearers (Ci = 0)

Compliers (Ci = 1)

Leagues with
NHL
2006
Games played

visors
56.84
(25.28)

Leagues with

mandatory
2001-2006

NHL

mandatory
2001-

visors

40.55
(19.28)

47.16
(28.26)

41.31
(20.37)

Goals per game

0.20
(0.14)

0.36
(0.26)

0.13
(0.12)

0.30
(0.24)

Assists per game

0.34
(0.19)

0.54
(0.33)

023
(0.15)

0.47
(0.30)

Penalty minutes per game

0.64
(0.38)

1.16
(0.89)

0.93
(0.66)

1.60
(1.17)

Number of seasons

Birth year

N = 1,262
N = 1,259
Always wearers (Ci = 0)

N = 2,460
N = 3,072
Compliers (Ci = 1)

1976.27
(4.29)

1976.48
(4.12)

Born in Canada

0.42
(0.49)

0.62
(0.49)

Born in Europe

0.46
(0.50)

0.20
(0.40)

Born in U.S.

0.12
(0.32)

0.18
(0.38)

First season

1997.31
(4.47)

1997.89
(4.43)

Weight

200.09
(13.31)

204.72
(15.51)

Height

5.80
(0.39)

5.83
(0.37)

N = 268

N = 565

Number of players
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Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper. For each variable
we report its mean and standard deviation in parenthesis. We report the statistics separately for
compliers—players who only wear a visor when mandatory—and always wearers—players who always
wear a visor. For each type of player we report separately his game-play statistics for the NHL 2001 to
2006 seasons and seasons in leagues that mandate visor use. See the text for a detailed description of the
variables.
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Table 2: Estimates of the impact of mandatory visors on penalty minutes per game

Penalty minutes per game
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel A. Full sample of leagues and seasons
Compliers in league that mandates visor use

Compliers

Leagues that mandate visor use

Mean of the dependent variable
R-squared
Observations
Number of players
Number of seasons × leagues

Compliers in league that mandates visor use

Wild bootstrap p-value
Compliers

Mean of the dependent variable
R-squared
Observations
Number of players
Number of seasons × leagues Included
covariates:

0.137∗∗
(0.057)

0.167∗∗∗
(0.050)

0.186∗∗∗
(0.055)

0.177∗∗∗
(0.057)

0.188∗∗∗
(0.048)

[0.061]

[0.059]

[0.060]

[0.060]

[0.049]

0.304∗∗∗

0.171∗∗∗

0.160∗∗∗

0.154∗∗∗

(0.033)

(0.038)

(0.038)

(0.039)

[0.046]

[0.042]

[0.042]

[0.042]

0.478∗∗∗

0.605∗∗∗

(0.066)

(0.055)

[0.075]

[0.099]

1.138
0.166
8053
833
293

1.138
1.138
1.138
1.138
0.337
0.364
0.390
0.737
8053
8053
8053
8053
833
833
833
833
293
293
293
293
Panel B. Estimates using the 2004 lockout of the NHL

0.365∗∗∗
(0.121)

0.429∗∗∗
(0.116)

0.406∗∗∗
(0.127)

0.406∗∗∗
(0.127)

0.438∗∗∗
(0.133)

[0.140]

[0.112]

[0.140]

[0.140]

[0.150]

0.064
0.215∗∗∗

0.023
0.056

0.074
0.061

0.074
0.061

0.063

(0.056)

(0.059)

(0.059)

(0.059)

[0.055]

[0.052]

[0.051]

[0.051]

0.806
0.205
1344
236
15

0.806
0.471
1344
236
15

0.806
0.475
1344
236
15

0.806
0.475
1344
236
15

0.806
0.729
1344
236
15
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Season effects
Player attributes
League effects
Season × league effects
Player fixed effects

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Notes: The table presents estimates of the effect of mandatory visors on penalties in minutes per game.
Panel A presents estimates for the full set of players who were active in the NHL from 2001 to 2006. Panel
B focuses on the 2001 to 2006 seasons and the set of players who were forced to move to European or
minor-pro leagues during the 2004 NHL lockout. Each column presents results from a different model
and the bottom rows report the covariates included in each model. Player attributes include dummies for
year and place of birth, position, weight and height. We provide two sets of standard errors. In
parenthesis we present standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within
players. In square brackets we report standard errors that are also robust to serial correlation within
season×league cells. In Panel B we also report the p−value for a test of the null hypothesis that visors have
no effect on penalties, computed using a wild bootstrap procedure. This test is robust to serial correlation
within individuals and within season×league cells. For the reported coefficients, those with ∗∗∗ are
significant at the 1% level; those with ∗∗ are significant at the 5% level; and those with ∗ are significant at
the 10% level. In all cases these tests of significance are computed using the standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 3: Estimates of the impact of mandatory visors on penalty minutes per game controlling for
interactions between league attributes and player type.

Penalty minutes per game

Pro
Full sample of leagues and seasons

Compliers in league that mandates visor use

leagues

leagues

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.188∗∗∗
(0.048)

0.271∗∗
(0.118)

0.250∗∗∗
(0.086)

0.282∗∗
(0.121)

0.438∗∗∗
(0.133)

0.656∗∗
(0.277)

0.201∗∗∗
(0.072)

0.186∗∗∗
(0.070)

0.908
0.741
5261
833

1.105
0.780
5820
833

Compliers in leagues with more PIM

-0.149

-0.092

-0.656

(0.210)

(0.230)

(0.761)

Compliers in competitive leagues

Mean of the dependent variable
R-squared
Observations
Number of players

American

NHL lockout in 2004

1.138
0.737
8053
833

1.137
0.737
8049
833

0.023

0.016

(0.027)

(0.029)

1.138
0.737
8053
833

1.137
0.737
8049
833

0.806
0.729
1344
236

0.806
0.729
1344
236

Notes: The table presents estimates of the effect of mandatory visors on penalties in minutes per game.
Columns 1 to 4 present estimates for the full set of players who were active in the NHL from 2001 to
2006. Columns 5 to 6 focus on the 2001 to 2006 seasons and the set of players who were forced to move
to European or minor-pro leagues during the 2004 NHL lockout. Column 7 presents estimates for the
sample of professional leagues; while column 8 presents results for the sample of the NHL and its feeder
leagues (minor-pro and major-junior leagues in Canada). All models include a full set of player and
season×league fixed effects. In columns 2, 4, and 6 we include interactions between compliers and the
average penalties in minutes per game earned in each league (computed only from always wearers). In
column 3 and 4 we include interactions between compliers and a measure of the competitiveness of each
league (see the main text for details). In parentheses we present standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within players. For the reported coefficients, those with ∗∗∗ are
significant at the 1% level; those with ∗∗ are significant at the 5% level; and those with ∗ are significant at
the 10% level.
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Table 4: Estimates of the impact of mandatory visors on penalty minutes per game controlling for
interactions between player attributes and league type.

Penalty minutes per game

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Panel A. Full sample of leagues and seasons

Compliers in league that mandates visor use

0.188∗∗∗
(0.048)

NHL cohort × league that mandates visor use

Birth cohort × league that mandates visor use

0.193∗∗∗
(0.047)

0.189∗∗∗
(0.047)

0.166∗∗∗
(0.048)

0.146∗∗∗
(0.047)

0.099∗∗
(0.041)

0.100∗∗
(0.044)

-0.042∗∗∗

-0.048∗∗∗

-0.047∗∗∗

-0.047∗∗∗

-0.040∗∗∗

-0.055∗∗∗

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.012)

(0.014)

-0.017

-0.010

-0.011

-0.010

0.030∗∗∗

-0.002

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.011)

(0.013)

-0.220∗∗∗

-0.176∗∗∗

-0.183∗∗∗

-0.032

-0.153∗∗∗

(0.050)

(0.054)

(0.055)

(0.050)

(0.053)

-0.056

-0.040

-0.036

-0.017

-0.063

(0.067)

(0.067)

(0.067)

(0.063)

(0.065)

0.040

0.066

0.076

0.086

0.062

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.056)

(0.067)

-0.118∗

-0.105

-0.020

-0.079

(0.067)

(0.067)

(0.061)

(0.066)

0.006∗∗∗

0.006∗∗∗

0.003

0.001

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.173∗∗

0.069

0.095

(0.070)

(0.064)

(0.066)

0.198∗∗

0.138∗

0.172∗∗

(0.082)

(0.076)

(0.078)

Centers in league that mandates visor use

Left wings in league that mandates visor use

Right wings in league that mandates visor use

Height × league that mandates visor use

Weight × league that mandates visor use

Canadians in league that mandates visor use

US players in league that mandates visor use

PIM in last season × league that mandates visor use

0.261∗∗∗
(0.023)

PIM in NHL × league that mandates visor use
Mean of the dependent variable

0.304∗∗∗
(0.065)
1.138

1.138

1.138

1.138

1.138

1.138

1.138
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R-squared
Observations
Number of players

Compliers in league that mandates visor use

0.737
8053
833

0.438∗∗∗
(0.133)

NHL cohort × league that mandates visor use

Birth cohort × league that mandates visor use
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0.741
0.743
0.744
0.744
8053
8053
8053
8053
833
833
833
833
Panel B. Estimates using the 2004 lockout of the NHL

0.787
7183
832

0.749
8053
833

0.444∗∗∗
(0.135)

0.441∗∗∗
(0.134)

0.427∗∗∗
(0.131)

0.403∗∗∗
(0.125)

0.328∗∗∗
(0.122)

0.358∗∗∗
(0.120)

-0.019

-0.020

-0.011

-0.009

-0.013

-0.008

(0.029)

(0.029)

(0.030)

(0.030)

(0.029)

(0.029)

0.015

0.017

0.009

0.008

0.013

0.009

(0.029)

(0.029)

(0.032)

(0.033)

(0.030)

(0.031)

-0.041

0.063

0.059

0.088

0.138

(0.170)

(0.189)

(0.189)

(0.180)

(0.188)

-0.026

-0.010

0.004

0.029

0.046

(0.203)

(0.195)

(0.196)

(0.185)

(0.186)

-0.021

0.011

0.001

0.005

0.043

(0.182)

(0.182)

(0.185)

(0.172)

(0.177)

0.164

0.198

0.250

0.234

(0.219)

(0.216)

(0.212)

(0.212)

0.003

0.003

-0.004

-0.005

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.006)

0.104

0.010

0.003

(0.177)

(0.176)

(0.182)

0.424

0.428

0.391

(0.313)

(0.295)

(0.300)

Centers in league that mandates visor use

Left wings in league that mandates visor use

Right wings in league that mandates visor use

Height × league that mandates visor use

Weight × league that mandates visor use

Canadians in league that mandates visor use

US players in league that mandates visor use

PIM in last season × league that mandates visor use

0.599∗∗∗
(0.219)

PIM in NHL × league that mandates visor use

0.648∗∗
(0.280)

Mean of the dependent variable
R-squared
Observations
Number of players

0.806
0.729
1344
236

0.806
0.729
1344
236

0.806
0.729
1344
236

0.806
0.731
1344
236

0.806
0.733
1344
236

0.809
0.745
1330
236

0.806
0.742
1344
236

Notes: The table presents estimates of the effect of mandatory visor use on penalties in minutes per game.
Panel A presents estimates for the full set of players who were active in the NHL from 2001 to 2006.
Panel B focuses on the 2001 to 2006 seasons and the set of players who were forced to move to European
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or minor-pro leagues during the 2004 NHL lockout. All models include a full set of player and
season×league fixed effects. Each column includes the interactions between the player attributes
reported in the table and leagues that mandate visor use. In columns 6 and 7 we use a measure of players’
penalties in the last season or a jackknifed average of his penalties in the NHL as proxies for his
aggressiveness (see the main text for details on these measures). In parentheses we present standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within players. For the reported coefficients,
those with ∗∗∗ are significant at the 1% level; those with ∗∗ are significant at the 5% level; and those with ∗
are significant at the 10% level.
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Table 5: Estimates of the impact of mandatory visor use on performance.
Measures of performance per game
Full sample of leagues and
NHL lockout in 2004
seasons
Goals per Assists per Points per Goals per Assists per Points per game game game
game game game
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Compliers in league that mandates visor use

Mean of the dependent variable
R-squared
Observations
Number of players

-0.025∗∗
(0.013)

-0.019
(0.015)

-0.044∗
(0.025)

0.003
(0.019)

-0.021
(0.028)

-0.018
(0.039)

0.237
0.683
8053
833

0.380
0.684
8053
833

0.617
0.712
8053
833

0.193
0.728
1344
236

0.317
0.740
1344
236

0.510
0.777
1344
236

Notes: The table presents estimates of the effect of mandatory visors on players’ performance. Each
column indicates the measure of performance used as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 3 present
estimates for the full set of players who were active in the NHL from 2001 to 2006. Columns 4 to 6 focus
on the seasons from 2001 to 2006 and the set of players who were forced to move to European or
minorpro leagues during the 2004 NHL lockout. All models include a full set of players and season×league
fixed effects. In parentheses we present standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation within players. For the reported coefficients, those with ∗∗∗ are significant at the 1% level;
those with ∗∗ are significant at the 5% level; and those with ∗ are significant at the 10% level.
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Online Appendix: infractions that result in penalty in minutes
• Abuse of officials: Arguing with, insulting, using obscene gestures or language directed at or in
reference to, or deliberately making violent contact with any on or off-ice official.

• Aggressor penalty: Assessed to the player involved in a fight who was the more aggressive during
the fight. This is independent of the instigator penalty, but both are usually not assessed to the
same player (in that case the player’s penalty for fighting is usually is escalated to deliberate injury
of opponents, which carries a match penalty). • Attempt to injure: Deliberately trying to harm an
opponent.

• Boarding: Pushing an opponent violently into the boards while the player is facing the boards.
• Butt-ending: Jabbing an opponent with the end of the shaft of the stick. It carries an automatic
misconduct.

• Charging: Taking more than three strides or jumping before hitting an opponent.
• Checking from behind: Hitting an opponent from behind. It carries an automatic minor penalty and
misconduct, or a major penalty and game misconduct if it results in injury. Illegal check to the head:
Lateral or blind side hit to an opponent, wherein the player’s head is targeted and/or is the principal
point of contact

• Clipping: Delivering a check below the knees of an opponent. If injury results, a major penalty and
a game misconduct will result.

• Cross-checking: Hitting an opponent with the stick when it is held with two hands and no part of
the stick is on the ice. Delay of game: Stalling the game.

• Diving: Falling to the ice in an attempt to draw a penalty.
• Elbowing: Hitting an opponent with the elbow.
• Fighting: Engaging in a physical altercation with an opposing player, usually involving the throwing
of punches with gloves removed or worse.

• Goaltender Interference: Physically impeding or checking the goalie.
• Head-butting: Hitting an opponent with the head. A match penalty is called when this occurs.
• High-sticking: Touching an opponent with the stick above shoulder level. A minor penalty is
assessed to the player. If blood is drawn, a double-minor is usually called. Referees may use their
discretion to assess only a minor penalty even when blood was drawn. They may also assess a
double-minor when blood is not drawn, but he believes that the player was sufficiently injured or
that the offending player used excessively reckless action with his stick.

• Holding: Grabbing the body, equipment, or clothing of an opponent with hands or stick.
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• Holding the stick: Grabbing and holding an opponent’s stick. Also called when a player deliberately
wrenches a stick from the hands of an opposing player or forces the opponent to drop it by any
means that is not any other penalty, such as Slashing.

• Hooking: Using a stick as a hook to slow an opponent, no contact is required.
• Instigator penalty: Being the obvious instigator in a fight. Called in addition to the five minute major
for fighting.

• Interference: Impeding an opponent who does not have the puck, or impeding any player from the
bench.

• Joining a fight: Also called the ?3rd man in? rule, the first person who was not part of a fight when
it broke out but who participates in said fight once it has started for any reason (even to pull the
players apart). This player is charged with an automatic game misconduct as well as any other
penalties they receive for fighting.

• Kicking: Kicking an opponent with the skate or skate blade. Kicking carries a match penalty if done
with intent to injure; otherwise it carries a major penalty and a game misconduct.

• Kneeing: Hitting an opponent with the knee.
• Roughing: Pushing and shoving after the whistle has been blown or checking an opponent with the
hands in his face.

• Slashing: Swinging a stick at an opponent; no contact is required.
• Slew Footing: Tripping an opponent with your feet.
• Spearing: Stabbing an opponent with the stick blade.
• Starting the wrong lineup: When the offending team fails to put the starting lineup on the ice at
the beginning of each period.

• Substitution infraction: When a substitution or addition is attempted during a stoppage of play after
the linesmen have signaled no more substitutions or if a team pulls its goalie and then attempts to
have the goalie re-enter play at any time other than during a stoppage of play.

• Too many men on the ice: Having more than six players (including the goalie) on the ice involved in
the play at any given time.

• Tripping: Using a stick or one’s body to trip an opponent.
• Unsportsmanlike conduct Arguing with a referee; using slurs against an opponent or teammate;
playing with illegal equipment; or making obscene gestures or otherwise abusing an official.
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Table A1: HOCKEY LEAGUES AND VISOR WEARING REGULATION.
Name

Short name

League type

Face protection

National Hockey League

NHL

Pro

Visors are non-mandatory

United Hockey League
American Hockey League
East Coast Hockey League
Central Hockey League
Western hockey league
Ontario hockey league
Quebec Major junior hockey league
British Columbia Junior Hockey League
Ontario Provincial Junior A Hockey League
British Columbia Hockey League
Saskatchewan Junior Hockey League
Atlantic Junior Hockey League
Metropolitan Junior Hockey League
Ontario Junior Hockey League
Canadian Junior Hockey League
United States Hockey League
North American Hockey League
Western Collegiate Hockey Association
Central Collegiate Hockey Association
NCAA East Division
Eastern College Athletic Conference
National Collegiate Athletic Association
College Hockey Association
Sweden Elitserien
Finland SM-liiga
Russian Elite League
Switzerland National League A
Deutsche Eishockey League

UHL
AHL
ECHL
CHL
WHL
OHL
QMJHL
BCJHL
OPJHL
BCHL
SJHL
AJHL
MetJHL
OJHL
CJAHL
USHL
NAHL
WCHA
CCHA
H-East
ECAC
NCAA
CHA
SEL
FNL
KHL
Swiss-A
DEL

Minor pro
Minor pro
Minor pro
Minor pro
Major junior (CA)
Major junior (CA)
Major junior (CA)
Junior (CA)
Junior (CA)
Junior (CA)
Junior (CA)
Junior (CA)
Junior (CA)
Junior (CA)
Junior (CA)
Junior (U.S.)
Junior (U.S.)
College (NCAA)
College (NCAA)
College (NCAA)
College (NCAA)
College (NCAA)
College (NCAA)
European elite
European elite
European elite
European elite
European elite

Mandatory since 2004
Mandatory since 2006
Mandatory since 2003
Mandatory since 2004
Mandatory since 1976
Mandatory since 1976
Mandatory since 1976
Mandatory since 1981
Mandatory since 1981
Mandatory since 1981
Mandatory since 1981
Mandatory since 1981
Mandatory since 1981
Mandatory since 1981
Mandatory since 1981
Always been mandatory
Always been mandatory
Mandatory since 1980
Mandatory since 1980
Mandatory since 1980
Mandatory since 1980
Mandatory since 1980
Mandatory since 1980
Mandatory since 1969
Mandatory since 1988
Mandatory since 1994
Mandatory by 2004
Mandatory since 1998

Notes: The table reports the leagues used in our study, as well as their respective regulation regarding visors
and face protection. In college leagues, players are required to use a full cage if they are under 18, and they
may choose between full cage or a visor if they are older. Mandatory visor wearing was introduced in
European and international leagues with a “grandfather clause” that exempted some players from wearing a
visor.

